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IRVING J. LEVY
Deploring the logic and the policy of the law prevailing in
most American states, Professor Garrard Glenn ventures that:
.. .it may not be too much to hope that the doctrine
relating to treasury stock is in for a revision . . . (and
that) possibly someone may deem it worth while to look at
the admirable model which has been provided in the place
where once sprung the common law, and where legislation of
good sort is to be found, modem as well as ancient." I
It is therefore proposed that before studying the "patholog-
ical" specimens of law relating to treasury stock in this country,
an examination be made of the "admirable model" presented by
the law of England. In considering the problems arising out of
the purchase by a company of its own shares, it will perhaps not
be unprofitable to review briefly the historical development of the
relevant English law.
I
There will be no problems arising out of the purchase by a
company of its own shares or a reduction in its capital stock until
the concept of capital as a permanent fund to be kept intact devel-
ops. No such notion arose in England until the seventeenth cen-
tury, at least.2 The early issues of shares in the East India Com-
pany were temporary and terminable at the end of each particular
business venture. 3 "Shares" were regarded as parts of the enter-
prise. In cases of temporary issues, as parts of the particular
'Glenn, Treasury Stock (1929) I5 VA. L. REV. 625, 642.
28 HOI.DsWoRTr, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1922) 216. Payment
of dividends out of capital was quite usual. I Scorr, CONSrrUTION AND
FINANCE OF ENGIUSH, SCOTTISH AND IRISH JOINT STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720
(igio) 6o.
8 HOtDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2o6. The fact that most early
corporations were "municipal" corporations probably accounts for the late
emergence of modem business corporation problems.
(45)
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joint adventure; where permanent, as fractional parts of the
several ventures on which the company might embark. And it
was not until 1657 that permanent joint stock was conceived and
used.4 Modem notions of shares of stock as financial units were
non-existent, and there were no provisions for reducing or increas-
ing the number of shares. The means of raising additional
capital was by increasing the contributions of the holders of the
original issue of shares-a system of "leviations" or calls.5  The
practice calls to mind a present day corporation, with, say, an
unalterable number of assessable non-par shares.
The development of modern ideas of shares of stock, and for
that matter of corporation principles generally, is more to be
found in the history of joint stock companies than in that of cor-
porations proper. When a charter from the Crown or a special
act of Parliament was a difficult and expensive thing to obtain, the
joint stock company proved a convenient organization for carry-
ing on commercial enterprises in which a large number wished to
participate. And so they became numerous. Although referred
to as "large partnerships" and developed out of the partnership
forms, they more closely resembled the corporation. Lacking the
corporate advantage of limited liability of the members, they were
also without the partnership handicaps of non-transferability of
membership and dissolution on the death of a member. Though
held to be choses in action, the shares were, at an early date, recog-
nized as freely transferable. 6 As far back as the sixteenth cen-
tury, shares in joint stock companies were frequently sold "outside
personal acquaintances and without limiting conditions." ' The
same was true with companies of limited liability. We are told
"that the whole nominal capital of the East India Company
changed hands once in two years." 8
4 Ibid.
5 1 Sco'rr, op. cit. supra note 2, at 45. The capitalization of companies was
seriously curtailed by the rigidity with which the original number of shares was
fixed. In the latter part of the 16th century the crude method oSf splitting shares
into fractional parts was devised for increasing the capital. Generally, the use
of calls was resorted to for additional money.
i Scorr, op. cit. supra note 2, at 442.
lbid.
8 Ibid. 453.
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In fact, speculation in shares was rampant in England in the
seventeenth century. Stock exchanges were active and most of
the present day practices of manipulation and trading in shares
were known and employed.' The notorious events which culmi-
nated in the rise and crash of the South Sea Company and in a
serious panic in 172o brought the belated attention of Parliament
to the wild speculation in shares, and brought about an attempt to
curb the use of joint stock companies. The so-called Bubble Act
of 1720,10 in true parliamentary fashion, ignored the wholesale
political bribery and the rashness of the scheme which caused the
debacle, and traced the troubles to the use of the corporate form
by joint stock companies without government charters. Obstacles
were thrown about the use of such joint stock companies with
transferable shares, which feature was to be enjoyed only by cor-
porate societies. But the formation of corporations was in no
wise made easier, nor was the manipulation of shares of a corpo-
ration proper in any way prevented. The act was directed only
against the joint stock company, and its development was hindered
to the distinct disadvantage of trade. 1 But we are told that the
attempt to eliminate them altogether was futile 12 and in 1825 13
the Bubble Act was repealed. Subsequent statutes 14 in quick
succession increased the utility of this form of business organiza-
tion, by conferring on them other corporate advantages. But
incorporation continued to be difficult. In fact the Crown was
given the power to attach unlimited liability on the members of
corporations by provision in their charters. 1  Not until 1844
'8 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2o6 et seq.
105 & 6 Gao. I, c. 18, § 18 (1M18).
' 8 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 216 et seq.
I Lindley, Companies (6th ed. 1902) 3.
6 GEo. IV, c. 91 (1825).
14In 1826 the statute of 7 GEo. IV, c. 46 (1826) permitted joint stock com-
panies to sue or be sued in the name of a public officer. See also I & 2 ViCT.
c. 1I0, § 14 (1837) etseq.; 5 VIcr. c. 5, §4 (842).
16 Gao. IV, c. 9i, § 2 (1825). The limited liability of members of cor-
porations which had charters from the Crown or special acts of Parliament was
recognized at an early date; in the case of the former, as early as the 15th
century. Only by express legislative enactment could incorporators be made
personally liable for debts of the company. 5 & 6 W. & M. c. 2o, § 25 (1693)
provided for individual liability if the corporation borrowed more than
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did Parliament endeavor to facilitate organization in corporate
form. In that year a statute 16 was passed enabling people to
obtain a certificate of incorporation without applying either for a
royal charter or for a special act of Parliament. Except, it seems,
in the case of banks thus formed, the advantage of limited liabil-
ity attachedY' Ten years later this privilege was conferred on all
companies organized under the earlier act, if their deeds so pro-
vided and their names were followed by the word "Limited." 18
With the passage in 1862 of the Companies Act,19 corpora-
tions in England entered their modem phase. Incorporation
became a matter of agreement under government supervision. Its
essence lay no longer in grant. Companies could thereafter be
formed with or without limited liability of members, and the
shares in both were freely transferable.
In view of the fact that, prior to this time, the difficulties
attending incorporation as a form of business organization greatly
limited its use, it is not surprising to find that most of the develop-
ment of the law of business organization is to be found in con-
nection with the joint stock company of large and small constit-
uency, formed under elaborate deeds of settlement. And the
problems which we are considering first appear in the reports
regarding the shares of joint stock companies. Although the
instances in which a member would be desirous of withdrawing
his interest in a venture and the company anxious to keep it from
passing to alien hands would seem likely to have occurred at an
early date, yet the problem does not appear to have arisen in the
English courts before the last century, and then only with the
revival of the free use of joint stock after the repeal of the Bubble
fi,2oo,ooo.; or if the capital was diminished by the payment of dividends so
that not enough remained to pay the corporate debts, the members were to be
liable to the amount of the dividends received. 8 & 9 W. III c. 20, § 49 (I696).
That the same injustice to creditors might arise from a reduction of capital or
from a purchase by a company of its own shares does not seem to have been
thought of and was not provided for.
'a7 & 8 VicT. c. io (844).
17 See Henderson v. Royal British Bank, 7 E. & B. 365 (1857). Cf. Taylor
v. Hughes, 2 Jo. & Lat. 25 (1844).
188 & I9 VIcT. c. 133 (1855).
1925 & 26 Vlc r. c. 89 (1862).
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Act.2 0 But the fact that the deeds of settlement of many com-
panies 21 made provision for the purchase of their own shares shows
that the practice probably prevailed long before it gave rise to any
litigation. The first cases arise under the Winding Up Act of 1842,
and in connection with the liability of members who have parted
with their shares to the company and who are sought to be included
in the list of contributors to make good the debts of the insolvent
company. In a joint stock company in which the members enjoy
no limited liability their inclusion in such lists might prove a
serious financial liability; in the case of a true corporation their
liability would extend to the amount unpaid on the shares and the
consideration which they received for the shares from the com-
pany.
The first cases lean to the view that if the power to purchase
or retire shares is included in the deed of settlement, it will be
upheld, and the retiring member will thereafter be free from
' Prior thereto, instances exist of the forfeiture of shares for failure to re-
spond to "leviations." The problem of calls had become a serious one and the
charters of some companies expressly provided for forfeiture. i ScoTT, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 342. It is to be observed that forfeiture resembles the purchase
by a company of its own shares in this wise: that the capital stock is, to that
extent, reduced and the shares forfeited become the company's. The power to
forfeit never presents any serious problem because the reduction is attended by
no expenditure of assets by the company, but, to the contrary, represents in a
sense a decrease in its "liabilities." Only in the case of subsequent insolvency
does the question of the liability of members whose shares have been forfeited
arise, or where such forfeiture was a device to immunize certain shareholders
from liability. See Spackman v. Evans, L. R. 3 H. L. 171 (1868). But that a
corporation must have the power to forfeit shares would seem to be clear.
Morgan's Case, i Mac. & G. 225 (1849). As early as 1723 we find the
question of a corporation's lien on its own stock arising. The Hudson Bay
Company provided in its by-laws that its stock should be liable for debts due
the company from its members, and that the company might seize and detain
the said stock for debts due. The court upheld the validity of this by-law and
ruled that other creditors of a bankrupt shareholder could not get at the
stock until the lien of the company was satisfied. Child v. Hudson's Bay Com-
pany, 2 P. Wins. 207 (1723) (reargued sub. nor. Gibson v. Hudson's Bay Com-
pany, i Strange 645 (1725). By-laws providing for forfeiture of stock for not
responding to calls are frequent by this time. In the above case Lord Maccles-
field said:
" . by the same reason that this by-law is objected to, the common
by-laws of companies to deduct the calls out of the stocks of members re-
fusing to pay their calls, may be said to be void."
However it was realized that such provisions might be injurious to creditors,
and the by-laws were strictly interpreted and held to extend to such claims as
could be recovered at law, and not in equity.
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responsibility for the debts of the company. 2  For, the obligations
of the remaining members being unlimited, the integrity of the
original capital fund for the benefit of creditors is not regarded
as essential. But even this principle is not well settled. Other
cases 23 deny the validity of such provisions and the retiring mem-
bers are included among the contributors. In the absence of any
express power, the same difference of opinion prevailed as to the
existence of any such power by implication.24  These early cases
are not carefully analyzed nor particularly well reasoned. The
deeper implications of granting or denying the power are not
realized nor considered.
II
The Companies Act of 1862, the first "general incorporation
statute," upon which the modem corporation law of England rests,
made no provision for the reduction of capital stock. It did,
however, provide for the purchase of the shares of dissentient
members who objected to certain changes which would work, in
effect, a dissolution of the company.25 This is the first statutory
authorization of what amounts to a purchase by a company of its
own shares, but there is present in the transaction the supervision
of the court whose sanction is necessary for the dissolution. In
the following year, the Company Clauses Act 26 authorized the
forfeiture of shares for non-payment of calls or the acceptance of
the surrender of shares in certain cases.2 7  In 1867,28 the gap
'Grady's Case, i De G., J. & S. 488 (1863) ; Ex parte Bennett, x8 Beav.
339 (1854) ; In re The Royal Bank of Australia, 4 De G. & S. 177 (185o). See
Ex parte Daniel, 26 L. J. Ch. 563 (856).
I Morgan's Case, supra note 21; Stanhope's Case, 3 De G. & S. i98 (185o);
Lawe's Case, i De G., M. & G. 42I (1852). See Munt's Case, 22 Beav. 55
(1856).
'Daniel's Case supra note 22; Stanhope's Case and Munt's Case, both
supra note 23. As to the liability of creditors in case of a purchase, see Evans
v. Coventry, 8 De G. M. & G. 835 (857).
=25 & 26 Vicm. c. 89, § 162 (1862).
'026& 27 Vc. c. 118, §§ 4, 9 & 10 (863).
'And then apparently only if the articles so provide; Teasdale's Case,
L. R. 9 Ch. App. 54 (873) ; Marshall v. Glamorgan Iron Co., L. R. 7 Eq. 129
(i868), and provided that no money be paid by the company for such surrender
or cancellation, though presumably other shares might be issued therefor.
Eichbaum v. City of Chicago, [189I] 3 Ch. 459; Rowell v. John Rowell & Sons,
[1912] 2 Ch. 6o9. But see the judgment of Stirling and Cozens-Hardy, L. JJ.,
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was filled by providing for the direct reduction of the capital by a
special resolution followed by the approval of the court. The
reduction is to be strictly supervised, creditors are to be listed and
notified and are entitled to object and be paid; in the case of con-
tingent liabilities, the court may dispense with payment or waiver
by requiring security for the ultimate satisfaction of the debts;
future creditors are to be notified of the reduction in the capital
by the company adding to its name, "and reduced," for a time.
Thereafter, the English courts had to face a new problem
relative to a company purchasing its shares. Reduction of capital
was provided for. Purchasing shares indirectly effected such a
reduction but there was no statutory authorization therefor. Un-
less such purchase were for the retirement of the shares and the
reduction of the capital, it would be for a resale and as such would
constitute a trafficking in shares. If the memorandum of associa-
tion did not authorize this as one of the objects of the company,
the purchase was ultra vires, void and incapable of ratification.20
If the memorandum or articles did authorize such an object, the
courts had to decide whether it was a legitimate one. When the
case came squarely before the court, the purchase was disallowed.
In Hope v. The International Financial Society, Ltd.,30 the
situation presented was that: at an extraordinary general meeting,
the board of directors were authorized to purchase shares from
willing shareholders to a total not exceeding IOO,OOO (out of
150,000 outstanding), which were not to be reissued without the
authority of a general meeting. Plaintiff, a small shareholder
and creditor of the company, enjoined the directors from acting
on the resolution. The basis for the injunction given by James,
L. J., on appeal was that: 31
in Bellerby v. Rowland, [1902] 2 Ch. 14, which casts doubt on that proposition.
The exchange of fully-paid stock for the surrender of shares not fully paid
would seem to be clearly objectionable.
'3o & 31 VICT. c. 131-139 (1867).
-' Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co., Ltd., v. Riche, L. R. 7 H. L. 653
(1875).
2046 L. J. Ch. 200 (1877).
"He retracted his dictum in Teasdale's Case, supra note 27, where he was
reported to have said: "There is no doubt that a company may give itself power
to purchase its own shares, to take surrender of shares and to cancel certifi-
cates of shares.
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"Either this is a purchase of shares in the sense of traf-
ficking in shares, which is a business not authorized by the
memorandum of association, or it is an extinguishment of the
shares and therefore a reduction of the capital. 3 2 If the for-
mer, it is ultra vires; if the latter, it is invalid because the
statutory method has not been followed."
After what seemed to have been a recession 33 from the view
in the Hope case, the House of Lords, in the carefully considered
and well-reasoned case of Trevor v. Whitworth,3 4 settled the
English law on the subject. The company's object was manufac-
turing flannel. Its articles authorized the company to purchase its
own shares, but this was not listed as an object in the memoran-
dum. The company had gone into bankruptcy, and Whitworth's
executors sued the liquidator of the company for the balance due
for shares sold to the company. The claim was not allowed.
The dilemma posited by James, L. J., in the Hope case was
regarded as inescapable by the Law Lords. Only by the method
prescribed in the Acts of 1867 and 1877 could the capital be
2 At page 203.
In re Dronfield Silkstone Coal Co., Ltd., i7 Ch. D. 76, 5o L. J. Ch. 387
(i88o) : The company was formed to conduct a coal business and "to do all
things conducive" to attaining that object. The articles permitted the directors
to purchase its own shares for the company, but there was no such provision
in the memorandum. In 1872 the directors purchased the shares of one Ward
who was dissatisfied with the way things were being run, and the shares were
then registered in the company's name; the transaction was made in good faith
and ratified by the stockholders. In 1879 the company was ordered wound up and
the creditors sought to have Ward included among the contributories. Jessel,
M. R., held the purchase invalid and ordered Ward included. The Court of
Appeal reversed the decision.
James, L. J., who delivered the opinion in the Hope Case, found no diffi-
culty in relieving the shareholder of all further liability, because he had ceased
to be a shareholder more than twelve months before the winding up. And a
"creditor qua creditor" had only the right to go after shareholders who had
transferred their shares within that time. The company, having ratified the
purchase, could no longer question it, and it was thought, therefore, that the
transaction was invulnerable. Cotton, L. J., said there was no "trafficking in
shares" because the purchase was to rid the company of a troublesome member.
It was analogous to a forfeiture and was not such a reduction in capital as re-
quired the statutory procedure.
The case was reluctantly followed by the courts as a binding precedent, but
the reasoning and the result were disapproved of even before Trevor v. Whit-
worth, infra. In re Balgooley Distillery Company, L. R. 17 Ir. 239 (1886), a
transfer of shares to the company in exchange for an overstock of whiskey
was upheld on the basis of the Dronfield case, but the Judges expressed their
disapproval of Jessel's decision in that case. See also Guiness v. Land Corpora-
tion of Ireland, 22 Ch. D. 349 (1882).
. 12 App. Cas. 409 (887).
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reduced. Only such objects as the memorandum listed as legiti-
mate spheres of operation could be prosecuted, and the provision
for other powers in the articles was ineffective. The germ of the
"trust fund" theory was here fully developed. Capital was there-
after regarded as a fund to be kept intact for creditors for the sat-
isfaction of their claims. Of course, that fund might become im-
paired through losses in the regular course of business, but that is
a risk which creditors must take. But, "they have a right to rely,
and were intended by the Legislature to have a right to rely, on
the capital remaining undiminished by any expenditures outside
these limits, or by the return of any part of it to the sharehold-
ers." 35 True, it may be necessary sometimes to reduce the capital,
and the statute allows it, but "the stringent precautions to prevent
the reduction of the capital of a limited company, without due
notice and judicial sanction would be idle if the company might
purchase its own shares wholesale, and so effect the desired result."
Lord Watson was troubled by the theoretical difficulty pf
having a company "become a member of itself." "It cannot be
registered as a shareholder to the effect of becoming debtor to
itself for calls, or of being placed on the list of contributories in
its own liquidation. ," " Lord Macnaghten saw other
objections to entrusting companies with such power. It developed
in Re Dronfield Silkstone Coal Co. 37 that such procedure was
employed to buy out undesirable shareholders:
"Who are the shareholders whose continuance in a com-
pany the company or its executives consider undesirable?
Why, shareholders who quarrel with the policy of the board,
and wish to turn the directors out; shareholders who ask
questions which it may not be convenient to answer; share-
holders who want information which the directors think it
prudent to withhold. Can it be contended that when the
policy of directors is assailed they may spend the capital of
3 Ibid. 416. (Opinion of Lord Herschell.)
'Ibid. 424. In the Dronfield case, stpra note 33, Jessel, M. RL, said:
".. the purview of the whole of the Act [Companies Act of 1862], when you
look at the sections relating to the winding up, the mode of winding up, and the
mode of enforcing contributions, is utterly inconsistent with the notion that a
company can be registered as a member of itself." The Court of Appeal, in
reversing Jessel, did not see fit to answer this propounded theoretical difficulty.
"'Supra note 33.
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the company in keeping themselves in power, or in purchasing
the retirement of inquisitive and troublesome critics ?"
Clearly not, he thinks. Further, even if the power to purchase its
own shares were found in the memorandum of association, it
would necessarily be void, says Lord Macnaghten. If it were
the only object of the company, it would dearly be illegal under
the Companies Act, for no company can be formed for the sole
purpose of trading in its own shares. "Does the purpose of the
association become lawful if legitimate objects are combined with
an object which is not legitimate?" he asked. The question, it
seems, is merely rhetorical.38
The rule is thus established in England. 9 A limited com-
pany can only reduce its capital by judicial proceeding in the
statutory manner. A shareholder can only rid himself of further
liability on his shares by payment in full or by a transfer to
another. The London Stock Exchange recognizes and approves
the rule by prescribing that companies which seek a quotation for
their shares on the Exchange must in their articles prohibit the
purchase of their own shares.
40
' This would seem to answer that line of American cases which holds that
the power to purchase its own stock is implicit in the power generally given in
the statutes or charter to corporations to "purchase and hold . . . property,
real or personal. . . !" See Berger v. U. S. Steel Co., 63 N. J. Eq. 809, 53
Atl. 68 (i9o2). it is probably true that a company in England will not be
permitted to purchase shares of a company which is a shareholder in the pur-
chasing company See In re Thomas [i916] 2 Ch. 331. This may also be an
implication of the new section, 45, in the 1929 Company Act, infra note 62.
'The law in Germany is quite similar. THE CommERcr.AL CODE, § 226
(Schuster translation, i9II) provides that: "A share company may not, in the
ordinary course of business, either acquire its own shares or take them as
security, except in the execution of a commission to purchase them for a third
party." However, the status of treasury stock in Germany is not the same as
it is in Anglo-American law. Thus, the company can exercise the rights oSf a
shareholder in respect to such shares as it holds; except that it cannot exer-
cise the right of pre-emption (Bezugrecht auiiben) since it may not subscribe
for its own shares.
In France, by amending its articles of association, a company may decide
which of its members should withdraw. This is analogous to a purchase. But
the member remains liable for the company's debts for a time. Law of July 24,
1867, § 52. 21 COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WoRL 197, et seq. However, the
French Trading association with variable capital is quite different from our
corporations, and in evaluating these provisions the same criteria cannot be
used.
10 Rules of the London Stock Exchange of March 23, 1Q2x, rules 151 & 152,
B (i), quoted in i PALE, CoMPAxY PREcEENTS (12th ed. i9o8) 255.
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The arguments in this country for permitting corporations
to purchase their own shares, at least out of surplus, are usually
as follows: First, that such power may be of great advantage to
a corporation in enabling it to remove undesirable shareholders
and replace them with desirable ones. 41 The answer to this argu-
ment was forcefully put by Lord Macnaghten, supra. If this be
a valid purpose in some instances, the English courts would say
that the remaining members should make the purchase, thereby
keeping the original contributed capital and financial set-up un-
changed. Secondly, to entice parties, otherwise reluctant, to pur-
chase stock by contracts to repurchase the shares at their option.4
2
This feature is of questionable value. It gives shareholders the
opportunity of retiring from failing ventures, and in so far as
creditors are likely to be unaware of the existence of such strings
to stock subscriptions, it seems somewhat fraudulent. Other
shareholders likewise may have cause to object because their abso-
lute subscriptions may have been made thinking the others have
also contributed their sums to the business without reservations.
The United States Supreme Court 43 has questioned the validity
of the practice. Thirdly, it is argued that the power permits
companies to make provision for the holding of stock as an inci-
dent of employment. The practice of employee-shareholders is
not unknown in England; an option in the remaining shareholders
to repurchase the employee's stock upon the termination of his
employment accomplishes the same purpose, and is not an unlawful
restraint on alienation. 44 Reissue of shares to incoming employees
may be made from these shares purchased from retiring em-
ployees or from authorized but unissued shares. Further, there
would probably be no objection in England to th practice of
compromising an otherwise uncollectible debt from a member by
accepting the surrender of his shares ;45 for his liability to cred-
Copper Belle Mining Co. v. Costello, ii Ariz. 334, 95 Pac. 94 (I9O8);
Cole v. Cole Realty Co., 16p Mich. 347, 135 N. W. 329 (1912).
See note (1928) 41 HARV. L. REv. 657; Schulte v. Boulevard Land Co.,
164 Cal. 464, 129 Pac. 582 (1913).
" Burke v. Smith, I6 Wall. 39o (U. S. 1872).
" Bargate v. Shortridge, 5 H. L. Cas. 297 (1851) ; Ex parte Penney, L. P.
8 Ch. App. 446 (872).
Lord Herschell in Trevor v. Whitworth, supra note 34, at 418; Cf. Hop-
kinson v. Mortimer, Harley & Co. [i917] 1 Ch. 646.
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itors would continue,46 for what it is worth, and since he is by hy-
pothesis, financially irresponsible, his release from calls would be
no loss to anyone. The recognized power in England to accept sur-
renders, to forfeit shares,47 and to take shares by gift or devise
refutes the other arguments for permitting such purchases.
The English courts have decided that the rule applicable to
companies in which the members enjoy limited liability does not
apply to "unlimited companies." As to such companies, there is
no prohibition against the purchase of their own shares. Members
may retire if the articles or memorandum so provide and be re-
lieved from liability to creditors in the absence of fraud or any
deliberate scheme to escape liability. In In Re Borough Commer-
cial and Building Society 48 the court held that the rule of Trevor
v. Whitworth did not apply to such companies. There is nothing
in the Companies Acts prohibiting an unlimited company from
purchasing its own shares. It is argued that the nature of a com-
pany in which all its members are liable for all the company's debts
does not require that any capital fund be kept intact:
"By the very force of the terms, it is plain that in the
case of an unlimited company the creditors know that there
is no fixed capital, and, therefore they have no right to com-
plain, if I may use the term, of a reduction of that which has
never been fixed in any way." 49
There could be no reliance, it is thought, because by exam-
ining the articles, creditors would find that a member could with-
draw by doing certain acts.50 In the actual case, in order to bor-
row money from the company, the applicant was required to take
up a number of shares. Upon paying his debt, he ceased to be a
member, and this court held that he was not liable for the com-
"Companies Act, 1929, Schedule A, Clause 27.
'Ibid. § io8, subsection 3; also Table A, clauses 23 et seq.
[893] 2 Ch. 242.
'9At page 255.
'0 The Judge suggests that there may very well be a different rule where the
articles give no such power of withdrawal. This feature would seem to be im-
portant only if the reason for the rule is the constructive notice to creditors,
and not the unlimited liability of all remaining members.
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pany's debts on a winding-up.5 1  The court distinguished 52 a
company of limited liability from one of unlimited, for in the case
of the former the creditors presumably rely on the integrity of the
capital, and the Companies Act prescribes the method for the
reduction thereof; Trevor v. Whitworth was approved as a rule
for cases involving such companies.
III
Since the later English courts have repeatedly expressed their
satisfaction with the rule of Trevor v. Whitworth, and Parliament
has by its most recent Corporation Act of 1929 given it statutory
approval, it remains to be seen how its implications have been
applied in fact situations which vary from the norm, but which
present the same basic problems as an outright purchase of shares.
Since 1862, in the case of the amalgamation or reconstruc-
tion of companies, dissentient members have been given the right
to an appraisal and payment of the value of their shares.5 3 To
the extent that there are dissentients whose shares are to be bought
up, this section authorizes indirectly the purchase of shares by a
company. This apparent exception to the prohibition in Trevor v.
Whitworth has never caused any difficulties, because the situations
arise only in cases where the company is being wound up and the
rights of creditors are taken care of. Wherever the rights of
creditors conflict with this statutory remedy for dissenting mem-
bers, the former prevail, and the entire proceedings are under court
supervision from the time application is made for approval of the
reconstruction scheme, 54 so that the apparent conflict between the
' It is not clear from the case whether the debts of the company accrued
before or after the retirement of the defendant. No distinction was made in the
opinion, and probably in the actual case the debts were of both periods. It is not
suggested by the opinion that it might make a difference in the result.
' Since the passage of the Companies Act in 1862, the English courts care-
fully differentiate between a true corporation and a joint stock company lacking
the limited liability feature. Prior thereto the essential difference between these
two forms of business organization was not clearly perceived, and the need for
different rules of law not fully appreciated.
I Op. cit. supra note 46, § 234. See I. J. Levy, Rights of Dissenting Share-
holders to Appraisal and Payment (i93o) i5 CoRm L Q. 42o pssim.
"A dissenter, moreover, will still remain liable to creditors of the company
after he has cashed in his shares. Part's Case, L R. io Eq. 622 (1870). Ex-
cept if the creditors have assented to look solely to the transferee company for
the satisfaction of its claims. Taurine Co., Anning and Cobbs' Case (1878) 38
L. T. Th 53.
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rights of dissenters and the prohibition against the purchase of a
company's own shares; presents no real difficulties.55
A surrender of shares not fully paid in, on the other hand,
may bring about the same undesirable situation as an outright
purchase. A surrender which involved the return of any money
to the shareholder, would be as objectionable as, if it could be dis-
tinguished from, an outright purchase. Such a transaction would
not be permitted, and even where the surrender involves no return
of money to the retiring member, objections are apparent.
Though, to the extent of the money which has already been paid
on the shares and which is forfeited by the surrender, the sur-
render reduces the obligations of the company to its members and
makes the financial position of the remaining shareholders that
much more desirable in respect of their share in the profits and
assets, the creditors are in no way benefited, but may easily be
prejudiced. For, in any event, the creditors' right to payment is
prior to that of the shareholders in the event of a dissolution; and;
in so far as such surrenders, if sustained, would release the mem-
ber from calls up to the amount unpaid, the position of creditors
is impaired.
In Bellerby v. Rowland, Etc. Co.56 the company suffered a
loss and the plaintiffs, directors, to make good the loss (though
not in fact liable), surrendered their shares to the company. The
shares were of the par value of Lii, of which Lio had been paid.
Thereafter the company prospered and the plaintiffs sued for the
return of their shares and recovered judgment on the strength of
Trevor v. Whitworth. The transfer was held to be ineffective
because it meant the release of the plaintiffs from calls, and the
situation was regarded as analogous to a purchase.57
' It is to be noted that this statutory right of dissenters runs counter to one
of the reasoni for the Trevor v. Whitworth rule, that the original capital in-
vested should be unimpaired by the withdrawal of any member. But here the
company is being dissolved, and in any case the members of companies buy into
such an arrangement, as the Companies Act provides therefor.
[1902] 2 Ch. 14.
It would seem that the decision in the case was unnecessary if its purpose
was merely to affirm the Trevor case. For the surrender did not release the
plaintiffs from liability for calls. Schedule A, § 27, Companies Act, I929. There-
fore, no one was prejudiced. The decision may have been motivated by the
desire on the part of the court to compensate these directors for their, what
proved to be, unnecessary generosity.
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But a surrender of fully paid shares would seem to be similar
to a gift and unobjectionable."8 Though the results of a forfeit-
ure of shares may be similar to those of a surrender, the power to
forfeit must be granted to a company to enable it to enforce calls.
And, since the forfeiture of shares does not release a member
from liability for the unpaid amount,5 9 creditors are not harmed.
So also, a voluntary surrender in cases where the statute permits a
forfeiture would seem to be permissible,60 as the equivalent of
forfeiture, and a voluntary gift or bequest of its shares to a com-
pany has been upheld in England, the objections to a purchase not
being present in such transactions. 61
Attempts made to evade the rule of Trevor v. Whitworth by
the indirect purchase of shares through a syndicate financed by the
company has been countered by a statutory prohibition in the 1929
Companies Act.6 2 A frequent method of circumventing the pro-
hibition had been to employ a syndicate to purchase a majority of
the shares in a company, borrowing the money temporarily from a
bank on the security of the shares to be purchased. The syndicate
then had its nominees appointed directors of the company, and
they loaned to the syndicate out of the company's funds enough
money to pay the bank. The statute now makes it unlawful:
. . .for a company to give, whether directly or indi-
rectly, and whether by means of a loan, guarantee, the pro-
vision of security or otherwise, any financial assistance for
the purpose of or in connection with a purchase made or to be
made by any person of any shares in the company. "
IV
The illustrations thus far follow along quite consistently with
Trevor v. Whitworth. But the English law relating to the sources
available for dividends and the reduction of capital are strange
bedfellows with the prohibitions against the purchase by a com-
pany of its own shares. The sanctity of the contributed capital
'In re Denver Hotel Compafiy, [1893] 1 Ch. 495.Op. cit. supra note 46, Schedule A, § 27.
' Bellerby v. Rowland, etc., Co., supra note 56, at 31.
SKirby v. Wilkins, i42 L. T. R. 16 (193o).
I9 &2o GEo. V, c. 23 §45 (1929).
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which Lord Herschell stressed is lost sight of when these analogous
problems come before the courts. The possible injury to creditors
is momentarily forgotten and the injury which shareholders may
suffer is not even perceived.
Since every reduction of capital in England must be brought
about under the supervision of the court,63 the problems are not
the same as in this country, where the reduction is attacked after
it has been effected. But this feature has not made the English
law any less flexible, for the English courts have displayed consid-
erable liberality in their approval of schemes for reduction. In
all cases the rights of creditors are taken care of, for it is a con-
dition precedent to any reduction that their claims be satisfied or
secured. The problems which will cause argument are the result-
ing relations among the shareholders. Lord Macnaghten puts
the procedure succinctly:
"Creditors are protected by express provision. Their
consent must be procured, or their claims must be satisfied.
The public, the shareholders and every class of shareholders,
individually and collectively, are protected by the necessary
publicity of the proceedings, and by the discretion which is
entrusted to the court . . . the safeguards . . . are
not inconsiderable. . '04
The discretion of the court is unlimited. It has jurisdiction to
confirm any kind of a reduction, even though it involves a depart-
ure from the "legal rights" of the different classes of stock. And
the same judges who decided Trevor v. Whitworth approved of a
reduction which was not made ratably among all the shareholders
in British and American Trustee and Finance Co. Ltd. v.
Couper.65 Lord Macnaghten, who in the former case showed
himself quite unenthusiastic about the need for a company to rid
Op. cit. supra note 46, § 56 et seq.64Poole v. National Bank of China, [19o7] A. C. 229.
[1894] A. C. 399. In this case the company carried on an investment
business holding some shares of American companies. The Board of Directors
was advised by an American committee made up of American shareholders.
Differences arose between the shareholders on both sides of the Atlantic as to
policy, and it was proposed to turn over all the American investments to the
American committee, and cancel their shares upon payment to the company of
;E1,ooo. The House of Lords approved of the transaction.
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itself of objecting members, thought it quite proper for a company
to divide the assets and enterprise between two factions through
a non-ratable reduction. The altered nature of the resulting ven-
ture and the altered status therein of objecting members failed to
move the court. "It is for the company, and for the company
alone," said Lord Macnaghten, "to judge of the prudence of the
course proposed." It is true that he finds that the proposed change
is not "unfair or inequitable in the ordinary sense of those words."
But neither was any oppressiveness shown in Trevor v. Whit-
worth. There, too, it was sought to rid the company of members
who disapproved of the policy of the directors, and yet His Lord-
ship asked in that case:
"Can it be contended that when the policy of directors
is assailed they may spend the capital of the company in keep-
ing themselves in power, or in purchasing the retirement of
inquisitive and troublesome critics ?"
The earlier cases 66 seem to have decided that a reduction of
capital must be an all-round one; that is to say, where capital is
to be paid off or to be cancelled as lost or unrepresented by any
available assets, or where the liability for unpaid capital is to be
reduced or extinguished, the same percentage should be reduced
on each share. This ratable reduction would leave each share-
holder the same proportionate interest and rights which he had
before. Any other scheme would disturb and alter the relative
positions of the members. This was applying the rule of Trevor
v. Whitworth significantly. For the purchase of shares by a com-
pany is injurious, not only to creditors, but it is objectionable also
in that it withdraws part of the original capital from the venture
and redistributes and changes the relative rights of the remaining
members. If, therefore the House of Lords in the Couper case
meant to disapprove of Lindley, L. J.'s, observation in Re Denver
Hotel Company,67 that by reducing its capital a company "cannot
prefer one shareholder to another of the same class by buying his
' In re Barrow Haematite Steel Co., [190o] 2 Ch. 846, 850 (Opinion of
Cozens-Hardy, J.) ; Union Plate Glass Co., [1889] 2 Ch. D. 513; Credit Assur-
ance and Guarantee Corporation, [9o2] z Ch. 6ol.
eT [1893] 1 Ch. 495.
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shares," then Trevor v. Whitworth loses its major significance.
It resolves itself into a rule of law which concerns itself only with
the interests of creditors. Being satisfied that they are protected
by the resort to the necessary statutory method for reduction, the
discretion of the court will only be directed to prevent an inequi-
table price for those shares retired or a fraudulent design. For
the House of Lords has also repudiated in Poole v. National Bank
of China 68 the intimation of Buckley, L. J., in Re Anglo-French
Exploration Co.,69 that the capital which is sought to be reduced
must have been lost or unrepresented by available assets. The
reason for the reduction is in the discretion of the majority of the
company. It leaves:
. . . the company to determine the extent, the mode, and
the incidence of the reduction and the application or disposi-
tion of any capital moneys which the proposed reduction may
set free." 70
It is not as if the argument were not presented to the court.
Counsel for the shareholder in the Couper case argued that the
proposal was bad not merely because it was a purchase of shares,
but because it involved dealing with shareholders in different ways.
The answer of the court was that mere difference of treatment did
not imply of necessity "anything unfair or inequitable in the trans-
action." It was sufficient, the court thought, if no fraud were
shown and the book value of the remaining shares was not imme-
diately hurt. The court failed to see that any reduction of capital
for the purpose of retiring some few shares is, without more,
unfair to objecting shareholders who should have the right to
have the venture continued as originally embarked upon, without
a depletion of the capital which was originally contributed for its
prosecution.71 Nor are dissenters given the right to be paid-out
' Supra note 64-
' [1902] 2 Ch. 845.
70 Lord Macnaghten in the Couper case, repeated by him in Poole v. National
Bank of China, supra note 64.
In Germany where a company may not purchase its own shares, the almost
necessary corollary exists that a reduction of capital must be applicable to all
shares, parri passu. Exch. Cas. 25, 258. See note 86, infra.
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and withdraw. 72  They are forced to continue as members of a
new enterprise.
V
A lawyer, considering the case of Burnes v. Pennel,73 decided
in 1849, might have thought that Lord Campbell's far-sighted
opinion, which roundly condemned the payment of dividends out
of capital, would have settled English dividend law in a way that
would have dovetailed neatly with Trevor v. Whitworth when that
case was decided as it was. Dividends were to be paid only out
of profits. Capital was to be reduced under court supervision as
the Acts of 1867 74 and 1877 75 provided; any other reduction
would be illegal. These are the implications of Burnes v. Pennel
and the Trevor rule, and were followed until the famous decision
in Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalt Co.7" That case held that a company
owning wasting assets might pay dividends regardless of deple-
tion and that this would not be such a return of capital as was
forbidden. The case involved the peculiar situation of a company
whose main assets were mines which were meant to be exploited
and depleted; but, though not all the remarks made in the opinion
were necessary for the decision, it nevertheless opened the way for
a whole line of cases which have held that capital losses of what-
ever nature need not be recouped before dividends are paid, if
current earnings are sufficient for that purpose.77 The Lee rule
has been applied to companies whose assets are not of the wasting
kind, but rather of such nature as should be kept intact if the
company is to continue operations, and to losses in capital entirely
accidental or consisting in depreciation for which sound business
policy has ever set up a reserve.
12 In some American states this remedy is afforded dissenters, because the
injustice of forcing them to continue in an altered venture is recognized. See
I. J. Levy, Rights of Dissenting Stockholders to Appraisal and Payment (1930)
I1 CORN. L. Q. 420.
122 H. L. Cas. 497 (1849).
.'30 & 31 VcT. c. 131 (1867).
1240 & 41 VIcT. c. 26 (1877).7041 Ch. D. I (1889).
7 Bolton v. Natal Land Co., f1892] 2 Ch. 245; Verner v. General and Com-
mercial Investment Trust, [1894] 2 Ch. 239; Bosanquet v. St. John del Rey
(1897) 77 L. T. 2o6; Lawrence v. West Somerset Mineral Railroad Co., [igi8]
2 Ch. 250.
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The House of Lords did not again have the question before it
until i9oI in Dovey v. Cord,78 where it was sought to make a
director liable for dividends paid to shareholders. The balance
sheet treated certain debts as good which were most certainly bad,
and it was claimed that thereby a loss in iapital had been caused
which should have been made up before dividends were paid. The
Court of Appeal 79 held for the defendant, and said that the divi-
dends were properly paid even though the capital had previously
been impaired. The House of Lords affirmed the decision on
another point, and expressly refused to adopt the view below on
the question of the sums available for dividends, several judges
showing an inclination to dissent from the view of the Court of
Appeal. But the subsequent decisions in the lower courts have
shown no tendency to retreat from the series of cases headed by
Lee v. Neuchatel, in spite of the adverse criticism which has been
levied against them 80 in England and in the United States and
the veiled disapproval of the House of Lords in Dovey v. Cord.
There was a distinction made, however, in the Court of Appeal
between a loss in "circulating" capital which must be replaced
before dividends should be payable out of current earnings, and
depletions in "fixed" capital which need not be replaced. The
latter is the capital in the form of building, equipment, etc., per-
manently dedicated to the business, the former the goods and cash
intended to be put in circulation to return with an accretion."
So far as the reliance of creditors on the capital fund for the
payment of their claims was involved, Trevor v. Wh.itworth made
no such classification of capital, nor any distinction between its
different forms. Lord Herschell said 82 the creditors:
is... have a right to rely and were intended by the Legis-
lature to have a right to rely on the capital remaining undi-
figoi] A. C. 477.
I899] 2 Ch. 629.
8o PALMER, COMPANY LAW (12th ed. 1924) 227 et seq.; Note x8 L. Q.
REV. 336; RERrna, P0 onTs, DMDENDS AND THE LAW (1926) ; Hatfield, Modern
Accounting (2d ed. 1917); Weiner, Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law
(1928) 28 COL. L. REV. mO46. See Sparger, Profits, S urplus and the Payment of
Dividends (1929) 8 N. CAR. L. REv. 14.
'Ammonia Soda Co. v. Chamberlain, [i9i8i z Ch. 266; Verner v. General
and Commercial Investment Trust, supra note 77.
82 Supra note 34, at page 414.
PURCHASE BY A COMPANY OF ITS OWN SHARES
minished by . the return of any part of it to the share-
holders."
It is safe to assume that the purchase of its own shares by a com-
pany out of "fixed capital" would have been as roundly condemned
by the House of Lords as one out of "circulating capital." The
evil against which that decision was directed is equally present in
both situations. Further on in his opinion, the same judge said:
"The shareholders receive back the moneys subscribed and
there passes into their pockets what before existed in the
form of cash in the coffers of the company, or of buildings,
machinery, or stock available to meet the demands of cred-
itors." S3 (Italics the writer's.)
Both fixed and circulating capital were listed indiscriminately, and
the withdrawal of either was considered objectionable. Factually
there is no less reliance by creditors on one than on the other; both
had to be kept intact from impairment by any non-statutory reduc-
tion of capital-at least until the Court of Appeal made an excep-
tion in respect to the payment of dividends.
Nor are creditors alone concerned with such a policy of divi-
dend law. Shareholders should have the right to insist on the
preservation of all the contributed capital for the prosecution of
the venture, except in the case of a legitimate reduction of capital
which the statutes authorize and which they are presumed to have
made part of their contracts with the company. "Trafficking in
shares," against which Trevor v. Whitworth was directed, was
undesirable not merely because it was ultra vires, but because it
resulted in an unauthorized change in the enterprise.
The payment of dividends out of current earnings, when cap-
ital losses have been suffered, produces the same result as an out-
right purchase of shares out of capital. It continues a venture in
an altered status, due to normal losses which have not been re-
paired by the retrenching essential to continuing the business as
originally embarked upon. It was the strain of attempting to
reconcile their dividend law with the unequivocal decision in the
I At page 416.
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Trevor case that brought forth from the Court of Appeal the novel
concept of capital which has found little favor.
The passive attitude of Parliament in the face of this con-
fusion is surprising. The careful and elaborate Companies Act
of 1929 is silent, except as it repeats the generality that "No divi-
dend shall be payable otherwise than out of profits." 84 Though
similar provisions in the earlier Acts have failed to aid the courts
in determining what were available profits, and the House of
Lords has intimated that their findings may well be erroneous,
Parliament has thrown no further light on the subject.
In fact, the Act of 1929 has added to the confusion. A new
section is introduced giving companies the power, if their articles
so provide, to issue preferential shares, which are, or at the option
of the company are to be, liable, to be redeemed out of "profits
available for dividends," or out of the proceeds of a fresh issue
of shares made for the purpose of redeeming the others.85 This
section is an exception to the prohibition against the purchase of
its own shares by a company, for such redemption, whether for
retirement or reissue, is in effect a purchase. When made out of
surplus profits, the practice would seem to be unobjectionable.
The capital fund originally contributed would be unimpaired both
for creditors and for continuing the business. Since the articles
so provide, there is an element of consent present among the
members and they later should not be heard to object. Where the
redemption is out of the proceeds of a fresh issue of shares for
Table A, § 91.
S§ 46. Hitherto the power to issue redeemable preference shares existed
only when given by a special act of Parliament. The section further provides
that where any such shares are redeemable otherwise thaff out of the proceeds
of a fresh issue, there must be transferred out of profits which would have been
available for dividends, a sum equal to the amount applied to redeeming the
shares to a reserve fund, to be called "the capital redemption reserve fund."
The provisions. of the Act relating to the reduction of the share capital are to ap-
ply as if the capital redemption reserve fund were paid-up share capital of the
company. If redeemable at a premium, the premium must, if the redemption is
out of the proceeds of a fresh issue, be provided for out of profits. The bal-
ance sheet of companies having such shares must show their existence, the
number, and the times when redeemable. The company and officers who violate
this sectio'n are liable to a fine not exceeding kioo.
The care with which the section guards the capital fund from impairment
through the use of redeemable shares, suggests that Parliament may disapprove
of existing dividend cases. This may also be the meaning of the use of the
phrase "profits available for dividends," and not merely "profits" or "sums
available for dividends."
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that purpose, there, too, the practice is unassailable.A6  But sup-
pose there have been capital losses, as in Verner v. General &
Commercial Investment Trust,17 or past losses have been ignored
as in Dovey v. Cord,"8 and the redemption is sought to be made
out of current earnings. The Court of Appeal has held that such
profits are available for dividends, and cpnsequently under the Act
they would be applicable for the redemption of shares. The same
arguments which militate against the use of such funds for divi-
dends-both from the standpoint of creditors and of remaining
shareholders-apply with the same force against their use for
redemption. And, just as it is difficult to see how the courts
which have approved of Trevor v. Whitworth have accepted the
Lee v. Neuchatel line of dividend cases, is it equally baffling to find
Parliament seemingly approving of both, or at least definitely
reaffirming the Trevor rule by statutory enactment and not ex-
pressly disapproving of the dividend decisions.
Of course the merit of this new provision in the act depends
on the further development of English dividend law. If the
series of cases following Lee v. Neuchatel prevails, the use of such
funds for redemption of preference shares would make the addi-
tion of Sec. 46 of questionable value to English company law.
However, the tone of Dovey v. Cord indicates that the Court of
Appeal view may not in the long run prevail.8 1 Mr. Palmer 9 0
In Germany, where the redemption of shares is likewise permitted where
the memorandum so provides, it must be done by following the procedure for
the reduction of capital except if such redemption is out of surplus-profits;
Commercial Code §§ 226, 227. If out of the latter, the practice would be unob-
jectionable; if through a reduction of capital, there is likewise no cause for
complaint. For the articles dealing with reduction of capital call for notice to
creditors, payment of or security for their debts, and the charter must provide
for a common plan of redemption applicable to all shares, ibid. § 28g. This is
similar to the law in some American states where the reduction or redemption
must be rateable. General Investment Company v. American Hide and Leather




' It is to be noted though that Lord Davey in that case made some remarks
which show that he has accepted the distinction between fixed and circulating
capital as having some merit, and that apparently that distinction may have
some bearing on the House of Lords' ultimate determination of English divi-
dend law. But see the opinion of Scrutton, L. J., in Ammonia Soda Co. v.
Chamberlain, supra note 81.
I Op. cit. note So, at 231 (Palmer).
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anticipates "further developments," when the House of Lords has
the issue before it again. It will require considerable repudiation
to make English dividend law square with Trevor v. Whitworth,
with which the courts do not seem to be displeased. In the mean-
time, we are told,91
" notwithstanding the Lee v. Neuchatel series of deci-
sions, companies, as a general rule, ascertain their profit on
sound business principles, and, acting under the advice of
competent auditors, decline to avail themselves of the power,
which the principles laid down in the discredited decisions
would allow, to inflate profits at the expense of capital."
It is probably true that the law relating to treasury stock in
most American states is sorely in need of revision, as Professor
Glenn has argued. But this cursory examination should show
that we cannot, without reserve, accept the English law as a
"model." There are many things we can learn from a study of
the English statutes and cases, but they will include the realization
of rules to avoid in our revision as well as features to adopt.
91 Ibid. 232.
